Political uncertainty and firm performance: Does Shariah compliance matter? by Abdelaal, Nourhan
American University in Cairo 
AUC Knowledge Fountain 
Theses and Dissertations 
2-1-2020 
Political uncertainty and firm performance: Does Shariah 
compliance matter? 
Nourhan Abdelaal 
Follow this and additional works at: https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds 
Recommended Citation 
APA Citation 
Abdelaal, N. (2020).Political uncertainty and firm performance: Does Shariah compliance matter? 
[Master’s thesis, the American University in Cairo]. AUC Knowledge Fountain. 
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/821 
MLA Citation 
Abdelaal, Nourhan. Political uncertainty and firm performance: Does Shariah compliance matter?. 2020. 
American University in Cairo, Master's thesis. AUC Knowledge Fountain. 
https://fount.aucegypt.edu/etds/821 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by AUC Knowledge Fountain. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of AUC Knowledge Fountain. For more 
information, please contact mark.muehlhaeusler@aucegypt.edu. 
  
 
School of Business 
Political Uncertainty and Firm Performance: Does 
Shariah Compliance Matter? 
 
A Thesis Submitted to 
 
The Department of Management 
 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for  
the degree of Master of Science in Finance 
 
 
By Nourhan Abdelaal 
 
(Under the supervision of Dr. Neveen Ahmed & Dr. Mohamed Bouaddi)  
January/2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2  
 
Political Uncertainty and Firm Performance: Does 
Shariah Compliance Matter? 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the relationship between political 
uncertainty and the performance of Shariah compliant firms. This thesis will examine the 
relationship between political instability and the performance of Shariah compliant versus 
non-Shariah complaint firms. This relationship will be examined on two samples. The first 
sample includes panel data of 12 emerged countries and 6 emerging countries, while the 
second sample covers US data. Two measures of political instability will be used. The first 
one is the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) Index and the second one is elections 
period. Two OLS models are implemented; both models provide evidence that Shariah 
compliance has a positive significant effect on firms’ performance. The panel data provide 
evidence that Shariah compliant firms perform better during periods of political instability. 
However, presidential elections negatively affect performance of Shariah complaint firms in 
the US. 
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Chapter I 
1. Introduction 
Recently, Shariah compliant finance boomed globally; Islamic Finance assets grew from 
US $ 200 billion up to US $ 1.8 trillion in the period from 2003 to 2013 (IMF, 2017). 
Demand for Shariah-compliant indices has also increased worldwide. According to a study 
by PwC (2011), Shariah-compliant indices reported an annual growth rate of 26 % for the 
first ten years of this century. They were first introduced in 1960s; and since then hundreds of 
Shariah Complaint Indices were launched all over the world to accommodate the interest in 
Shariah Compliant Investment. Among the most famous Shariah complying indices are Dow 
Jones Islamic Market Index (DJIM) and FTSE Global Islamic Index Series (GIIS).  
Shariah compliant finance follows Shariah principles. Shariah prohibits investing in 
certain activities including: alcohol, pork products, pornography, weapons, or gambling.  In 
addition, Shariah principles require that the risk of a transaction must be shared between the 
borrower and the lender. Thus, Shariah complaint firm have specific financial characteristics 
associated with leverage and liquidity1.  
          In recent years, many studies tried to capture the effect of Shariah compliance on 
firms’ performance and whether the special financial characteristics of Shariah complaint 
firms result in better performance or under performance in comparison to conventional firms. 
In this thesis, the effect of political uncertainty on performance of Shariah firms and how it 
differs in comparison to non -Shariah firms will be examined. 
         Political uncertainty (periods of political changes, significant events or unrest) affects 
the performance of stock market. The reason is that those periods of uncertainty triggers 
different investors’ behaviors. The magnitude of effect of such uncertainty is likely to differ 
                                                          
Shariah complaint firms must have a debt ratio < 33 %, cash ratio < 33% and receivables ratio < 49%, for 
screening calculations refer to research methodology in chapter 3 
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depending on other firm- specific and country-specific variables.  Even though both Shariah 
and non -Shariah firms are likely to be affected by political uncertainty; yet the effect will 
vary due to the distinguished nature of Shariah compliant firms. 
      Shariah complaint firms cannot rely on debt in capital expenditure or in running 
operation; thus, limiting sources of financing for new projects or growing the business. 
However, Shariah complaint firms are likely to benefit from maintaining lower leverage 
during periods of crisis/uncertainty; this is because a lower leverage level reduces risk of 
bankruptcy and inability to pay debt. 
Political instability affects the stock market; however, the effect varies from one firm 
to another. Stock performance and volatility of returns depend on the type of industry and the 
degree of exposure of a firm’s operation to threats associated with political uncertainty 
(Beaulieu et. al.2005). Thus, excluding investment in volatile industries such as alcohol and 
gambling is likely to positively impact performance of Shariah compliant firms during 
periods of political or economic uncertainty/crisis (Al-Khazali et al. (2014); Jawadi et al. 
(2014); Ho et al. (2014)).  Other studies argue that there is no significant difference in 
performance of Shariah vs. non-Shariah firms' performance (Hassan and Girard (2011); 
Setiawan & Oktariza (2013)).  
The contribution of this thesis is to add to the limited literature available on Shariah 
compliant firms by investigating how political uncertainty/instability affects performance of 
Shariah complaint firms in comparison to non-Shariah firms. 
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows: 2) Literature Review & Hypothesis 
Development, 3) Data & Research Methodology, 4) Results and discussion and 5) 
Conclusion and References.  
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Chapter II 
2. Literature Review &Hypothesis Development 
 
2.1 Literature on Performance of Shariah vs. Non Shariah: 
In this section, literature on performance of Shariah and non-Shariah firms will be 
covered to identify the main arguments on how Shariah firms perform versus non-Shariah 
firms; particularly whether there is a significant difference in their performance.  
Shariah compliance directly affects firms’ fundamentals including type of business 
activity, leverage level, riskiness and sources of financing. Shariah screening is tied to 
transparency and efficiency in managing limited financial resources and thus adding value in 
the long run.  
Pepis and Jong (2019) applied a long-term event study approach using data for 28 
years covering the period from 1990 to 2018 to investigate the effect of Shariah compliance 
on long-term performance of firms. Return on asset (ROA) and return on sales (ROS) as well 
as rebalanced annual stock returns were used to investigate the performance of shariah firms 
versus a control group of non-shariah firms. The study concluded that in the long-term 
shariah compliant firms resulted in higher ROA and ROS in comparison to the control group. 
This suggests that reducing debt level and receivables to abide by shariah promotes efficient 
management of resources and adds strategic value for firms in the long run. 
Akguc & Al Rahahleh (2018) examined the relationship between shariah compliance 
and operating performance. The study applied a multivariate regression model on data of 
Shariah complaint and non-Shariah compliant firms in GCC area to investigate how 
profitability is affected by Shariah compliance. The study concluded that complying with 
7  
 
shariah adopted leverage and liquidity ratios results in higher profitability margins. This is 
because Shariah-complaint firms have lower cost structure and debt and require efficient 
management of assets and resources.  
Setiawan & Oktariza (2013) investigated the relationship between risk and return for 
Shariah and non-Shariah companies listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange using data from 
2009 to 2011. They investigated the relationship between returns and firm-specific financial 
ratios (Debt/ Equity Ratio, Earnings per share, Price Earnings Ratio, Net Profit Margin, 
Return on Equity, and Price to book value) for both Shariah and non-Shariah companies. 
Risk-adjusted returns measured by Sharpe Ratio, Treynor ratio and Jensen’s Alpha proved 
that there is no significant difference between the performance of Shariah complaint and non-
Shariah complaint firms. In addition to that, their results proved that returns of both Shariah 
and non-Shariah firms are significantly affected by Debt to Equity Ratio, Earnings per share 
and Return on Equity.  
Low leverage level is one of the main factors that distinguish shariah complaint firms 
in terms of risk and return. High leveraged firms are more likely to experience a decline in 
market value of equity in comparison to low leveraged firms during periods of downturn 
(Opler and Titman, 1994). This indicates that shariah complaint firms provide a less risky 
investment; which raises the concern about risk-return trade of shariah complaint firms versus 
their counterparts.   
Al-Zoubi and Magheyreh (2007) applied several Value-at-Risk (VaR) methodologies 
to investigate the relative risk performance of Dow Jones Islamic Index versus its 
conventional index. Using data to cover the period from 1996 to 2005, they concluded that 
the Islamic index presented a less risky investment when compared to the conventional Dow 
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Jones World Index. The authors concluded that the Shariah adopted profit and loss sharing 
principle results in a significantly lower risk in comparison to the market. 
To capture risk-return tradeoff between Shariah and non shariah complaint firms, 
Albaity and Ahmad (2011) compared the returns and volatility of two Islamic indices and two 
socially responsible indices listed in UK and US versus the performance of the conventional 
indices. The study proved that there is no significant difference between the returns of any of 
the indices, thus no risk premium is required for Islamic indices. The study also investigated 
the sensitivity of the indices to news and concluded that bad news has a greater impact on all 
indices in comparison to good news. This indicates that all markets are sensitive to bad news; 
where markets become more volatile when stock prices decrease significantly. This is 
primarily due to investors’ perception of higher level of risk as stock prices fall.  
Colina and Gatti (2009) created a hypothetical Shariah compliant portfolio from listed 
Italian companies and compared its performance to the benchmark. The study concluded that 
the Shariah compliant portfolio beat the benchmark during periods of boom, growth and 
crisis while it underperformed the benchmark during moderate periods. The plausible shariah 
complaint index was mostly dominated by the well-established Italian retail and goods 
sectors. Thus, the study proves that abiding by shariah financial rules do not contradict with 
efficient stock picking strategies used by portfolio managers to create a well-diversified 
portfolio.  
Hussein and Omran (2005) compared the performance of the Islamic Index in Dow 
Jones against the performance of Dow Jones World Index. The study applied CAPM, 
Treynor ratio and Sharpe ratio while subdividing the data into three periods. The data was 
subdivided into full period, bull period and bear period. During the full and bullish period, the 
Shariah complying index was reported to outperform the conventional index. However, the 
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Islamic Index in Dow Jones underperformed Dow Jones World Index in bearish period. 
According to the study the screening criteria adopted by Islamic Index in Dow Jones results 
in excluding large global firms and thus the index comprises of smaller firms that are subject 
to higher volatility of returns. 
A more comprehensive study by Hassan and Girard (2011) used data of seven indexes 
chosen from the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index (DJIM) to examine the performance of 
Shariah versus non-Shariah complaint indexes using data from 1996 to 2005. The study 
controlled for several factors: “market risk, size, book-to-market, momentum, local and 
global factors”. They concluded that the variance in returns between Shariah and 
conventional indices is not significant; where both the Shariah and conventional indexes have 
similar reward to risk and diversification benefits. Moreover, the study concluded that shariah 
screening resulted in investing in growth focused small-cap industries while conventional 
indices include more value-focused industries of mid-cap size of higher environmental risk 
such as energy and chemicals industries.  
A study by Rejeb and Arfaoui (2019) applied a standard GARCH model to monthly 
data of market returns of ten shariah indices and their counterparts during the period from 
1996 to 2016. The period under study includes several financial events such as Brother 
Lehman collapse, extreme market movements into 2008, GFC and the Eurozone crisis 
(EZDC). The study proved that both conventional and Islamic indices are affected by the 
financial crisis due to volatility spillover during subprime crisis. Nevertheless, shariah 
complaint indices outperform conventional indices in terms of informational efficiency. 
Other studies proved that Shariah complying firms outperform non-Shariah 
complying firms in times of crisis (Al-Khazali et al. (2014); Jawadi et al. (2014); Ho et al. 
(2014)). Jawadi et al. (2014) compared the performance of three Dow Jones Islamic Indices 
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(World, USA and Europe) to the performance of their benchmarks before and after the 
subprime crisis. The study concluded that even though both Islamic and conventional indices 
were affected by the crisis, however the Islamic index performed better during the downturn. 
Al-Khazali et al. (2014) reached the same conclusion by applying stochastic dominance 
(SD) analysis to nine Dow Jones Islamic Indexes and their benchmark and comparing their 
performance during the global financial crisis in 2007 to 2012. According to Farooq and 
Alahkam’s (2016) findings, Shariah firms perform better during crisis due to their 
distinguished financial characteristics of low leverage and low account receivables. Such 
financial characteristics reduce their vulnerability to bankruptcy and failure to collect 
receivables from customers during periods of crisis.  
A study by Miniaoui et.al (2015) sheds the light on performance of shariah complaint 
indices and conventional indices in GCC countries during 2008 financial crisis. They applied 
GARCH model to six GCC markets (Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar) 
to investigate the effect of the financial crisis on volatility of returns across shariah complaint 
indices and conventional indices. The study concluded that the effect of the financial crisis on 
Shariah complaint indices differed across GCC countries. Risk affected volatility of Shariah 
indexes and their counterparts in three countries (Saudi Arabia, Oman and Qatar); while no 
significant affect was captured on volatility of returns for the rest of the countries. The study 
concluded that the effect of the financial crisis on volatility of returns varied across GCC 
countries regardless of Shariah compliance. Thus, implying that both shariah and non-shariah 
indices in GCC countries are subject to similar risk.  
Touiti and Henchiri (2016) investigated the behavior and market efficiency of twenty 
Shariah complaint indices from Dow Jones family and their conventional counterparts during 
subprime crisis. They attempted to capture the effect of the crisis on performance of indices 
using risk-adjusted return measurements (Sharpe ratio (SR), Treynor index (TI) and Jensen's 
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alpha). They concluded that Islamic indices are vulnerable to crisis; both Islamic and 
conventional indices recorded higher volatility and lower returns during subprime crisis. 
Nevertheless, four Islamic indices outperformed their counterparts in period of crisis in terms 
of returns. Mixed results about performance of Shariah complaint indices during crisis are in 
line with the study by Hassan and Girard (2010). 
Albaity and Ahmad (2011) conducted a comparative study to investigate the difference in 
returns and volatility between three Islamic indices listed in USA, United Kingdom and 
Malaysia. They applied a Generalized ARCH-GARH model (GARCH-M) for daily data 
covering 8 years. The study concluded that there is no significant difference in the returns of 
the three indices. The study reported leverage effect for the two indices listed in USA and 
United Kingdom, but no leverage effect was reported for the index listed in Malaysia. The 
paper argues that this is due to larger market capitalization of the US and UK indices in 
comparison to the Malaysia Index.  
2.2 Literature on Political Risk, Stock Returns 
This section highlights the findings of several studies that investigated how political 
instability affects firms’ performance. Political Instability creates an uncertain environment; 
which triggers different investors’ behaviors depending on their perception on how different 
financial investments would behave during uncertainty.  The degree by which political 
instability impacts firms’ performance during periods of uncertainty is directly linked to firm 
specific characteristics and operational activity. 
Sun and Liu (2018) used the five components of the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) Rating model: Government Stability, Socioeconomic Conditions, Investment Profile, 
Internal Conflict and External Conflict, to investigate how political risk affect volatility of 
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stock returns. The study included data from China, United Kingdom, Mexico and Iran and 
applied a GARCH (1,1) model. Government Stability and socioeconomic conditions were 
reported to have significant impact on stock returns and volatility on all countries; as 
government instability and unstable economic conditions might result in change in laws and 
rules thus causing uncertainty about future performance of different industries. The study 
concluded that developing countries are more vulnerable to political risks in comparison to 
developed countries due to higher level of challenges encountered by developing countries 
and more critical political decisions, which could reshape the business environment. Similar 
results were obtained by Vortelinos and Saha (2016) who used monthly data of 66 countries 
for 13 years to investigate the effect of political risk on stock returns and volatility. 
Vortelinos and Saha (2016) applied an Ordinary Least Squared method using twenty political 
indicators extracted from The ICRG Index as proxy for political instability. Inflation rate, 
stock market capitalization, Gross Domestic Product, trade integration and interest rate were 
used as control variables to run the regression. The study proved that the effect of political 
risk on returns and volatility differs depending on country of operation; due to the effect of 
socioeconomic conditions in shaping the perception of investors about the level of risk 
associated with political events and required returns.  
Malik et al. (2009) investigated the effect of major political events on performance of 
stocks listed on Karachi Stock Exchange. The study applied Phillips Person unit root test to 
investigate how trading volume and returns were affected by resignation of President Pervaiz 
Musharraf. They reported high fluctuations in trading volumes and stock returns due to high 
volatility of stock prices during intense political events. This is because intense political 
events confuse the market participants and their perception about risk aversion resulting in 
increase in short selling and traded volumes. 
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Beaulieu et al. (2005) investigated the effect of political risk on volatility of stock 
returns of firms listed on the Canadian Stock Exchange using data from 1990 to 1996. The 
study applied a GARCH model to investigate how news related to Quebec's independence 
from Canada affected the volatility of returns. The study concluded that the volatility of 
returns is highly associated to the extent of firms’ exposure to political risk, where firms that 
operate internationally or have high potential for growth are less affected by negative news. 
Locally operating firms with high assets in place were reported to have higher volatility of 
returns, due to difficulty of relocating.  
Chau et.al (2014) used data of conventional and Islamic indices in MENA region to 
investigate how political uncertainty arising from Arab Spring affected stock market 
volatility. The study applied several asymmetric GARCH models to measure volatility of 
conventional and Islamic indexes in 6 MENA countries. The study concluded that political 
instability results into high volatility of returns due to reduced business confidence and 
investors perception about up rises and protests as an increased risk in the market. According 
to the study, both conventional and Islamic indices were affected by political instability; 
however Islamic indices were more volatile. This is because Islamic indices in the MENA 
region invest heavily in oil and gas industries; which are more vulnerable to political turmoil. 
         Ahmed (2018) applied a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) framework to 
investigate the effect of political instability on Shariah compliant and conventional indices in 
developing and developed countries. ICRG index was used to investigate how the level of 
political risk affects prices of MSCI Islamic stock market indices and its conventional 
counterpart over the period from 2005 to 2016. The study proved that shariah complaint 
indices are less sensitive to political uncertainty in developed countries than their 
counterparts, which could be attributed to nature of industries that shariah complaint indices 
invest in. In developing countries, both shariah and non-shariah complaint indices were 
14  
 
significantly affected by political uncertainty; as political instability in weaker economies is 
accompanied by reduced country credit ratings thus increasing required equity premium in 
the market. The study concluded that political uncertainty induces higher risk environment to 
equity market and increases required equity risk premium by investors; both shariah and non-
complaint firms are not immune to this unsuspected risk. 
According to above literature, political instability triggers uncertainty. Nevertheless, the 
effect of this uncertainty on firm’s performance is correlated to firm specific characteristics 
and country specific characteristics; we build our first hypothesis: 
H01: Shariah compliant firms perform better during political instability   
2.3 Literature on Elections and Stock Performance 
Several studies investigated the effect of elections on stock returns and volatility. 
Elections are usually accompanied by uncertainty about future policies and laws adopted by 
new governments; causing a disturbance in the stock market.  
Chien et.al (2014) applied an ordinary least square model to investigate the 
relationship between DJI returns as proxy of market returns and US presidential elections 
using data of 27 presidential elections. The study provided evidence that stock market returns 
are affected by elections; as movement in returns following elections period reflects investors' 
perception about the future of economy under the new ruling government. Hence, market 
returns will increase in case investors are optimism and confident in the new government and 
decreases incase investors are pessimistic about the changes to be implemented by the new 
ruling government. 
Bouoiyour and Selmi (2017) applied an event study methodology to investigate the 
effect of political uncertainty associated with presidential elections on stock returns. The 
study concluded that different industries react differently to political uncertainty; depending 
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on the announced presidential campaign. Industries that are expected to benefit from new 
rules and changes in laws witnessed an increase in returns post-election announcement while 
industries expected to be negatively impacted by new rules and regulations witnessed a drop 
in returns. 
Bialkowski et.al. (2006) investigated the effect of national elections on stock market 
volatility using data of 27 OECD countries. They applied a volatility event-study approach 
using a GARCH Model and concluded that index return variance elevates significantly in 
elections week due to uncertainty of election results changes that would occur in the business 
environment depending on the new ruling government.  
Boutchkova et al. (2011) investigated the relationship between political stability and 
stock market volatility across different industries. A regression model was run using panel 
data, where the independent variable is the industry volatility. Several independent variables 
were used to control for political factors including ICRG index as proxy for political risk, 
autocracy level and dummy variable for national elections. The study proved that the effect of 
political instability varies across industries, as volatility of returns increases for more 
politically sensitive industries in comparison to other industries. Politically sensitive 
industries include trade dependent and labor-intensive industries. Local political risks were 
reported to affect industries that are labor intensive and trade dependent due to risk associated 
with new stricter labor laws. Nevertheless, industries with international trade exposures are 
affected by political risks in countries of trading partners due to raised concerns about 
changes in macroeconomics policies by newly elected governments.  
Goodell and Bodey (2012) investigated the changes in Price to earnings (P/E) ratios 
during six US presidential election cycles; providing evidence that P/E ratios decrease as 
results of elections becomes more predictable. This is due to decrease in volatility and in 
uncertainty about future growth and risk. 
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Goodell and Vähämaa (2013) investigated the effect of US presidential elections on 
implied volatility of S&P 500 index options; using VIX implied volatility index. A linear 
regression model was applied to investigate how market perception about the winner of 
elections will affect volatility; using the change in market prices of Iowa Electronic Markets 
(IEMs) over five election periods as proxy for market opinion. IEMs are presidential future 
contracts; with the payoff based on the election outcome. The study showed evidence that a 
strong positive relationship exists between implied volatility and market expectations about 
whether the expected winner will result in macroeconomic policy changes.  
Based on above literature, national elections are accompanied by uncertainty, which affects 
performance of all firms’ and stock market. However, different industries react differently 
depending on the nature of each industry and how investors interpret the effect of new laws 
and regulations on different business sectors. 
 We build our second hypothesis: 
H02: National elections affect performance of shariah complaint and non- shariah complaint 
firms  
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Chapter III 
3. Data and Research Methodology 
This chapter discusses data used and research methodology applied to investigate the effect 
of political instability on firms' performance.  This study uses panel data of 12 developed and 
6 developing countries from 2010-20172 to investigate the effect of political instability on 
firms' performance.  Section 3.1 discusses the data used and sources of data. Section 3.2 
includes summary statistics of the data used. Finally, Section 3.3 explains the methodology 
used to identify Shariah complaint firms, the model implemented and chosen variables.  
3.1 Data  
 
Financial performance: financial performance is measured by two variables; Tobin’s Q 
(Total market value of firm divided by total book value of firm) and Adjusted market returns 
(Calculated as the return of a given company minus the relevant index return representing a 
given market.). The two variables are obtained from DataStream. 
Political instability:  The study uses the political index of The International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) by PRS group as a measurement of political stability3.  This political index is 
used by previous literature 4 as proxy of political instability; where a risk rating of a country 
is determined based on 12 risk components. A country score is collected out of 100 points 
(maximum 100 and minimum 0) based on the total score received in the twelve components; 
below table explains the 12 components and the fixed weight of each: 
                                                          
2 Twelve emerged countries (Netherlands, Australia, France, Canada, United Kingdom, Italy, Ireland, USA, 
Spain, Sweden, Hong Kong, Singapore) and six emerging countries (Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Russia, Greece, 
Mexico) 
3 The ICRG is a researcher data set released by the political risk services group, comprising of 22 variables that 
rate political, financial and economic risks for 146 countries, a separate risk rating index is available for each of 
the three categories. This paper uses the annual averages political risk rating dataset available on PRS website as 
proxy of political risk. 
4 See previous work of Boutchkova et al. (2011) , Vortelinos and Saha (2016) and Sun and Liu (2018) 
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Component Component Points (max.) 
Government Stability  12 
Socioeconomic Conditions  12 
Investment Profile  12 
Internal Conflict  12 
External Conflict  12 
Corruption                                         6 
Military in Politics  6 
Religious Tensions  6 
Law and Order  6 
Ethnic Tensions  6 
Democratic Accountability  6 
Bureaucracy Quality  4 
Table (1): ICRG Political index components, Source: PRS International Country Risk 
Guide  
 
Several control variables are used including firms’ specific variables and country 
level variables; obtained from DataStream. Country-level variables include GDP, inflation 
rate and interest rate as proxy for macroeconomic conditions. Those variables are chosen 
based on previous literature conducted to investigate the effect of political instability on 
performance including the work of Vortelinos and Saha (2016); Beaulieu et al. (2005) and 
Hassan and Girard (2011). Firms’ specific variables include size, asset growth, dividend 
payout and earning per share as proxy for firm financial characteristics. Table (2) below 
explains how control variables are calculated: 
Control Variable  Definition 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets is use as proxy for size 
Asset growth Represents asset growth rate in comparison to previous year; calculated as 
(current year's total assets / last year's total assets - 1) * 100 
EPS Earning per share; represents how much the company makes for each share 
of its stocks; calculated as (net income of the company - dividend on 
preferred stocks) / weighted average number of shares outstanding 
Dividend payout Calculated as dividends per share / earnings per share * 100 
GDP Gross Domestic Product is the total production of goods and service across 
a country within any given year. 
Inflation  The consumer price index (CPI) as a proxy for inflation 
Table (2): Control variables 
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3.2 Summary statistics 
3.2.1 Descriptive statistics  
 
Table (3) shows the descriptive statistics for the sample. It shows the mean, median, 
maximum, minimum, standard deviation and number of observation. The mean for log 
Tobin’s Q is 0.233 with a maximum of 2 and minimum of -4.04 and a standard deviation of 
0.46. The average for adjusted returns is 0.02 with a maximum of 3.5 and a minimum of -1.6 
and a standard deviation of 0.49. ICRG has mean of 79.96 with a maximum of 88.5 and a 
Table (3) 
Descriptive Statistics (2010-2017) 
 
 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum St.Dev. No.of Obs 
       
Log Tobin’s Q 
 
0.233310 0.219232 2.000000 -4.045714 0.460895 47111 
Adjusted returns 
 
0.020420 -0.028717 3.508341 -1.644039 0.496262 47111 
Political Stability Variable 
 ICRG 79.96100 81.41667 88.58333 55.75000  6.191272 47111 
Firm Specific Variables 
 Size 5.109126 5.191525 10.26781 -0.080748 1.314030 47111 
 EPS -0.265570 0.028000 450.4000 -1234.459 24.71168 47111 
 Dividend payout 17.71449 0.000000 100.0000 0.000000 25.76655 47111 
Asset Growth 16.95316 4.860000 994.4200 -99.39000 71.65494 47111 
Country Level Variables 
 GDP 2.377640 2.400000 25.10000 -9.200000 1.801430 47111 
 Inflation 2.159901 1.900000 15.50000 -1.700000 1.662902 47111 
 Interest rate 5.162410 4.200000 52.10000 1.300000 5.764616 47111 
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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minimum of 55.75 and a standard deviation of 6.19. The mean for size is 5.1 with a 
maximum of 10.2 and minimum of -0.08. EPS has mean of -0.2 with a maximum of 450.4 
and a minimum of -1234.4. Dividend payout has a mean of 17.7 with a maximum of 100 and 
minimum of zero. The mean for asset growth is 16.9 with a maximum of 994.4 and a 
minimum of -99.3. For GDP the mean is 2.3 with a maximum of 25.1 and a minimum of -9.2. 
Inflation has a mean of 2.15 with a maximum of 15.5 and a minimum of -1.7. The mean for 
interest rates 5.16 with a maximum of 52.1 and a minimum of 1.3. 
3.2.2 Correlation Matrix 
 
Table 4 shows the correlation matrix for the sample. There is a positive correlation between 
adjusted returns and log Tobin’s Q, GDP, inflation, size, EPS, dividend payout and asset 
growth; while there is a negative correlation between adjusted returns and ICRG and interest 
rates. There is a positive correlation between log of Tobin’s Q and ICRG, GDP, EPS, 
Dividend payout and asset growth. While there is a negative correlation between log of 
Tobin’s Q and inflation, interest rates and size. There is a positive correlation between ICRG 
and GDP and asset growth. While there is a negative correlation between ICRG and inflation, 
interest rates, size, EPS and dividend payout. There is a positive correlation between GDP 
and size, dividend payout and asset growth. While there is a negative correlation between 
GDP and inflation, interest rates and EPS. There is a positive correlation between Inflation 
and interest rates, size, EPS, dividend payout and asset growth. There is a positive correlation 
between Interest rates and size and dividend payout. While there is a negative correlation 
between interest rates and EPS and asset growth. There is a positive correlation between size 
and EPS and dividend payout. While there is a negative correlation between size and asset 
growth. There is a positive correlation between EPS and dividend payout and asset growth. 
There is a negative correlation between dividend payout and asset growth. 
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3.2.3 Multicollinearity test 
 
The variance inflation factor (VIF) test was conducted to check for presence of 
multicollinearity between the x-variables (Shariah, ICRG, GDP, Inflation, Interest rate, Size, 
Asset growth, Dividend payout and EPS). As per test results reported in Appendix (1), the 
reported magnitude of multicollinearity is within the tolerance level of VIF below 5. Thus, 
indicating absence of multicollineratiy   between the x-variables chosen to run the regression 
model. 
  Table (4): Correlation matrix
Corr. 
Adjusted 
returns 
Log  
(Tobin’s Q) ICRG GDP Inflation Interest rate Size EPS Dividend Payout Asset growth 
Adjusted returns 1.000000          
Log (Tobin’s Q) 0.251994 1.000000         
ICRG -0.014290 0.136547 1.000000        
GDP 0.113795 0.008621 0.286125 1.000000       
Inflation 0.036709 -0.114096 -0.428119 -0.007465 1.000000      
Interest rate -0.003090 -0.087472 -0.464830 -0.097606 0.511500 1.000000     
Size 0.056314 -0.087280 -0.221600 0.024501 0.111312 0.115250 1.000000    
EPS 0.050386 0.007595 -0.034205 -0.008208 0.001561 -0.006812 0.057732  1000000   
Dividend Payout 0.098316 0.088510 -0.098852 0.039090 0.044258 0.082466 0.305217 
              
0.050264 1000000  
Asset growth 0.170820 0.129851 0.056237 0.037097 0.005814 -0.011306 -0.050551   0.001597 -0.061659 1.000000 
Source: Author’s calculations 
3.3 Research Methodology 
3.3.1 Shariah compliance screening methodology  
 
This study applies S&P shariah screening methodology on panel data of the selected 18 
countries.  According to S&P methodology, shariah complaint firms exclude several business 
sectors including: gambling, tobacco, alcohol, weapons, pork, casinos and entertainment, 
gambling, pornography and financial sector (with the exception of Islamic banks); firms 
involved in those activities were identified as non-shariah firms. 
The second step is to calculate leverage compliance and cash compliance; where shariah 
complaint firms must abide to below ratios:    
Cash compliance  
 Accounts Receivables / Market value of Equity (36-month average) < 49 %  
 (Cash + Interest Bearing Securities) / Market value of Equity (36-month average) < 
33% 
Leverage compliance: 
 Debt / Market Value of Equity (36-month average) < 33 %  
Firms that passed the two screening criteria was labeled as shariah complaint using a 
dummy variable (Shariah complaint=1, non-shariah complaint=0)  
3.3.2 Model  
 
The study uses two multiple regression models to investigate the effect of political instability 
on firms' performance. The first model uses ICRG index as proxy of political instability and 
applies an ordinary least square model to panel data of 12 developed and 6 developing 
countries from 2010 to 2017. 
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The second model investigates how uncertainty associated with national elections 
affects firms' perform using US data from 2010-2018; where a dummy variable is used to 
identify election years (election year=1, non-election year = 0) 
Fixed parameters for cross-section and period are used, which refers to a statistical model 
where the mean for each control variable is fixed rather than taking the means as a random 
sample from the population. We estimate the fixed estimator through running an Ordinary 
Least Squares regression in which we have a constant standard deviation for the control 
variables. 
 OLS Model 1: ICRG and firms’ performance  
 
𝑳𝒐𝒈(𝑻𝒐𝒃𝒊𝒏′𝒔 𝑸)   
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 + 𝛽2𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦  + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡_ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑃𝑆
+ 𝛽6𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑_𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 +  𝛽7 𝐺𝐷𝑃 +  𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
+ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟           
(𝑨𝒅𝒋𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒆𝒅 𝑴𝒂𝒓𝒌𝒆𝒕 𝑹𝒆𝒕𝒖𝒓𝒏𝒔)
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 + 𝛽2𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦  + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑃𝑆
+ 𝛽6𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑑_𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐺𝐷𝑃 +  𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽9𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
+ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟                 
OLS Model 2: Elections and Performance (based on US data)  
 
𝑳𝒐𝒈(𝑻𝒐𝒃𝒊𝒏′𝒔 𝑸)
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ _ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
+ 𝛽4𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑃𝑆 + 𝛽6𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑_𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 +  𝛽7 𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟            
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                                                Chapter IV 
4. Results  
4.1 Results of OLS Model 1: ICRG and firms’ performance 
 
Regression results of the first model are presentenced in Table (5) below. The results 
provide evidence that financial performance as measured by (Adjusted market returns) and 
(log Tobin’s Q) is positively affected by political stability (as measured by ICRG) and shariah 
compliance as measured by (Shariah_ dummy). Moreover, (Cross Effect _ICRG _Shariah) is 
reported to have a negative significant relationship with firm’s performance, thus indicating 
that shariah complaint firms outperform non- shariah compliant during periods of political 
instability. This is aligned with previous work of Al-Khazali et al. (2014); Jawadi et al. 
(2014); Ho et al. (2014) who provided evidence that Shariah complaint firms perform better 
during periods of instability due to their operation in less volatile industries and reduced 
vulnerability to bankruptcy in case of political turmoil.  Thus, we accept our first hypothesis 
that shariah compliant firms perform better during periods of uncertainty.  
  In terms of firm’s specific control variables, (Dividend_ payout) and (Asset_ growth) 
are both reported to have a positive significant relationship with (Adjusted market returns) 
and (log Tobin’s Q); implying that firms’ investment in assets and dividend payout policy 
impact stock prices; and thus impacting stock returns and market perception of stock value. 
This is justified since one of the main ways for companies to attract investors is high 
dividends payout ratio, especially in bearish times when there is less growth opportunities for 
investment so there is less need to retain earnings. Consequently, high dividend payout ratio 
results in an increased demand on the stock of a company; thus driving its value 
upwards.  Moreover, constant asset growth can be linked to an increase in operating assets; 
which is reflected in future growth opportunities. Consequently, promising future growth 
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would drive the market value of a company upwards, leading to a higher market-to-book 
value ratio (Tobin’s Q). 
A significant negative effect of size on Adjusted market returns and log (Tobin’s Q) is 
reported which could be attributed to the fact that the smaller the size of the company; the 
more returns required by the market to invest in that company due to higher inherent risk. On 
the other hand, larger firms are more established and less risky; hence they incur lower 
required return by the market to invest in.  
            A significant positive relationship between (GDP) and (Adjusted market returns) was 
reported which could be attributed to the fact that higher GDP levels for a given country is 
associated with successful growing economies. Growing economies are characterized by a 
successful micro-economy on the collective level, which means high performing companies 
in the stock market. Hence, GDP growth and companies returns are positively correlated. 
This is in-line with the theory that the long-term GDP growth rate can be taken as a proxy for 
the long-term market growth. Moreover, referring to the demand side of the GDP equation, 
higher GDP indicates higher business spending or investments or government spending, 
which usually means more resources available to be invested in capital markets. Hence, 
capturing potential growth opportunities and high business growth; thus higher returns. 
In terms of country specific macroeconomic control variables, (Inflation) and 
(Interest_ rate) were reported to a significant negative relationship with firm’s performance. 
When inflation increases, costs and expenses of companies increase. However, companies 
cannot fully pass this increase to consumers resulting in smaller profit margins and less 
expansionary capital investments. Thus, companies are limited in capturing future growth 
opportunities, which negatively impact their market value.  
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Dependent Variable 
Measures of Financial Performance 
 
Table (5) 
(1) 
Adjusted market returns 
(2) 
Log (Tobin’s Q) 
Constant 0.095975* 
(0.124350) 
 
1.312007*** 
(0.066776) 
Shariah_ dummy 0.168451** 
(0.089236) 
 
0.228418*** 
(0.048854) 
ICRG 0.002822** 
(0.001485) 
 
0.003721*** 
(0.000740) 
Cross Effect _ICRG _Shariah -0.002137** 
(0.001102) 
 
-0.001500** 
(0.000604) 
Size -0.066423*** 
(0.008075) 
 
-0.284023*** 
(0.006192) 
GDP 0.017992*** 
         (0.001853) 
 
0.010559*** 
(0.000901) 
Dividend _ payout 0.000718*** 
         (0.000177) 
 
0.001024*** 
(9.41E-05) 
Asset _growth 0.001178*** 
(3.14E-05) 
 
0.000432*** 
(1.92E-05) 
Inflation -0.009301*** 
(0.002459) 
 
-0.011727*** 
(0.001073) 
 
EPS  
 
 
Interest_ rate                             
 
2.95E-05 
(8.71E-05) 
 
   -0.008865*** 
(0.001612) 
8.47E-05 
(6.93E-05) 
 
-0.000944* 
(0.000889) 
 
 
Observations 52178 48111 
R-squared 0.361056 0.778362 
Adjusted R-squared 0.210819 0.723677 
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error. 
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively 
The above regression was conducted using the following equation  
𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 + 𝛽2𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦  + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑃𝑆
+ 𝛽6𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑_𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 +  𝛽7 𝐺𝐷𝑃 +  𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽9 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒
+ 𝛽10𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟           
where the dependent variables used were Adjusted Returns and Log (Tobin’s Q) 
alternatively. 
28  
 
 
4.2 Results of OLS Model 2: Elections and firms’ performance 
 
Results of the second regression model based on US data and political elections as a measure 
of political uncertainty are reported in Table (6) below. According to the results, financial 
performance as measured by (Log Tobin’s Q) is positively affected by shariah compliance as 
measured by (Shariah _dummy); indicating that the US shariah - compliant firms are 
characterized by better performance. Moreover, the regression provides evidence that US 
national elections as measured by (Elections _dummy) has a significant negative effect on 
firms’ performance. This is aligned with previous work of Chien et.al (2014); Sun and Liu 
(2018); Bialkowski et.al (2006); providing evidence that uncertainty surrounding elections 
negatively affects firms’ performance due to ambiguity surrounding the new government and 
possible changes in the business environment.  
Based on a second regression run reported in Table (7) below, performance of Shariah 
complaint firms is negatively affected by national elections in the US; where (Cross Effect_ 
Elections_ Shariah) is reported to be significantly negative. This implies that non-shariah 
firms perform better during the US national elections; which could be attributed to perception 
of investors about potential negative changes related to the shariah complaint business sectors 
in the US.   
Based on our dataset, the US Shariah complaint firms are mostly associated with 
Healthcare, Technology and Industrial sectors5. Accordingly, regression is re-run three cross 
effect variables to investigate the effect of elections on healthcare, technology and industrial 
sectors. Results of the regression reported in Table (8) provide evidence that healthcare, 
technology and industrial sectors are significantly negatively affected by presidential 
                                                          
5 Classification of sectors is based on DataStream classification, which classifies business sectors into   main 
sectors: Basic materials, Consumer cyclical, Consumer non-cyclical, Energy, Healthcare, Industrial, Technology, 
Telecommunications and Utilities. 
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elections as measured by (Cross Effect_ Elections_ Healthcare), (Cross Effect_ Elections 
_Technology) and (Cross Effect _Elections _Industrial) respectively. This is in line with 
previous work of Bouoiyour and Selmi (2017); Boutchkova et al. (2011) who provide 
evidence that the effect of elections varies across industries; depending on whether a specific 
industry is expected to benefit from the agenda of the new president or otherwise.  
  As for the control variables, (Dividend_ payout) and (Asset_ growth) are reported to 
have a significant positive relationship with (log Tobin’s Q); while (Size) and (inflation) are 
reported to have a significant negative effect on (log Tobin’s Q). This is in line with results of 
the first model including the full dataset.  
(GDP) is reported to have a negative significant relationship with firm’s performance, 
which is different than the results obtained by the first model of the full dataset, which could 
be attributed to risk characteristics of US during presidential elections.  
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Dependent Variable 
Measures of Financial Performance 
Table (6) (1) 
Log (Tobin’s Q) 
Constant 1.557634*** 
(0.073654) 
 
Shariah_ dummy 0.034667*** 
(0.006600) 
 
GDP -0.022935*** 
(0.005633) 
 
Inflation -0.033295*** 
(0.003168) 
 
Asset Growth 0.000446*** 
(5.07E-05) 
 
Dividend Payout 0.001026*** 
(0.000214) 
 
Size -0.189529*** 
(0.012599) 
 
Elections_ dummy -0.012712** 
(0.006998) 
Observations                                  12301 
R-squared                               0.762043 
Adjusted R-squared                               0.715590 
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error. 
(2) *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively 
The above regression was conducted using the following equation  
 
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 _ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ _ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 _ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ
+ 𝛽5 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 _ 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 +  𝛽6 𝐺𝐷𝑃 +  𝛽7𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟            
 
where the dependent variable used was Log (Tobin’s Q)  
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Dependent Variable 
Measures of Financial Performance 
Table (7) (1) 
Log (Tobin’s Q) 
Constant 1.535898*** 
(0.072043) 
 
Shariah_ dummy 0.043329*** 
(0.005549) 
 
Asset Growth 0.000446*** 
(5.07E-05) 
 
Size -0.188056*** 
(0.012569) 
 
Dividend Payout 0.001023*** 
(0.000214) 
 
GDP -0.020339*** 
(0.004924) 
 
Inflation -0.031940*** 
(0.003028) 
 
Cross Effect_ Elections_ Shariah -0.075313*** 
(0.016090) 
Observations                            12301 
R-squared                         0.762473 
Adjusted R-squared                         0.716103 
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error. 
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively 
The above regression was conducted using the following  
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠_ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ _ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡_ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ
+ 𝛽5 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝛽6𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑_𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 +  𝛽7 𝐺𝐷𝑃
+ 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟            
 
where the dependent variable used was Log (Tobin’s Q) 
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Dependent Variable 
Measures of Financial Performance 
Table (8) (1) 
Log (Tobin’s Q) 
Constant 1.562634*** 
(0.073014) 
 
Inflation -0.033192*** 
(0.003101) 
 
Dividend_ payout 0.001019*** 
(0.000214) 
 
Size -0.190600*** 
(0.012606) 
 
EPS -0.000137 
(0.000105) 
 
GDP -0.022460*** 
(0.005268) 
 
Asset_ growth 0.000448*** 
(5.08E-05) 
 
Shariah_ dummy 
 
 
0.033870*** 
(0.006193) 
Cross Effect_ Elections_ Healthcare 
 
 
-0.025190** 
(0.013143) 
Cross Effect_ Elections _ Industrial  
 
 
-0.010231* 
(0.012670) 
Cross Effect_ Elections _Technology  
 
 
-0.025983** 
(0.012635) 
Observations                                 12301 
R-squared                               0.762171 
Adjusted R-squared                               0.715659 
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error. 
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively 
The above regression was conducted using the following equation  
 
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 _𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ _𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 _ 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑃𝑆 
+ 𝛽6𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 _𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 + 𝛽7 𝐺𝐷𝑃 +  𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ 𝛽9 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 _ 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 _ 𝐻𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑒 +  𝛽10𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_ 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 _𝑇𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑦 
+  𝛽11𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_ 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 _𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑙 + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟     
 
where the dependent variable used was log (Tobin’s Q) 
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4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
 
A sensitivity analysis was conducted for regression model 1. As per results reported in 
Table (9) to Table (17) in Appendix (2), the first run provided evidence that a significant 
positive relationship exist between (Shariah_ dummy) and the two dependent variables (Log 
Tobin’s Q and Adjusted market returns), which is in line with the results of our regression. 
The regression was then re- run after adding ICRG variable, which confirmed the presence of 
significant positive relationship between political stability and firms’ performance. Each of 
the control variables was added gradually and the regression was rerun. Results of the several 
runs conducted confirmed the presence of a negative significant relationship between (Cross 
Effect_ ICRG_ Shariah) and the two independent variables and a positive significant 
relationship between the control variables (GDP, Asset growth and Dividend _ payout) and 
the two dependent variables. Moreover, results confirmed the presence of a significant 
negative relationship between the two control variables (Inflation and Interest_ rate) and the 
two independent variables.  
A second sensitivity analysis was conducted for the US model. Results reported in Table 
(18) to Table (24) in Appendix (3) confirm the presence of a significant negative relationship 
between elections and firms’ performance and a significant negative relationship between  
(Cross Effect_ elections_ shariah) and firms’ performance.  Moreover, results of the runs 
confirms the presence of a significant positive relationship between two control variables 
(Asset growth and Dividend _ payout) and firms’ performance and the presence of a 
significant negative relationship between three control variables (Inflation, GDP, Size) and 
firms’ performance. 
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CHAPTER V 
5. Conclusion 
This thesis aims to shed the light on performance of Shariah firms versus non-Shariah 
firms and how it’s affected by political uncertainty. Literature covering performance of 
shariah complaint equities and political risk is covered in depth in Chapter I of this thesis. 
Following previous studies, two measures of political uncertainty are chosen: the political 
index ICRG by PRS group and national elections period. The political index ICRG is used 
extensively in literature as a political risk rating. Moreover, national elections is considered a 
period of uncertainty due to its high impact on future of business environment; thus it allows 
for capturing the effect of uncertainty on firm’s performance.   
Data of listed Shariah and non-Shariah firms is collected from 18 countries during the 
period (2010-2018) to investigate how different political uncertainties affect performance. 
Two OLS regression models are run; where the first model includes the full panel dataset for 
the period 2010-2017 to investigate the effect of political stability as measured by ICRG 
index on firms’ performance. The second model is run using a US dataset to investigate how 
national elections in the United States during the period 2010-2018 affected firms’ 
performance.  
Results of the first model and second model are discussed in Chapter III. The first 
model provides evidence that shariah compliance is positively related to firms’ performance 
during periods of political instability. This could be attributed to their specific financial 
characteristics and their operation in less volatile industries. The second model provides 
evidence that shariah compliance is associated with better performance in the US; however 
shariah compliant firms are negatively affected by national elections. Firms’ performance 
during election years is tied to expected changes in the business environment. Hence, 
performance of industries expected to benefit from the agenda of the newly elected president 
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is positively affected by elections, while industries expected to be penalized from new rules 
or regulations are negatively affected. 
This thesis provides a better understanding of how Shariah compliance affects 
performance, specifically during periods of uncertainties, which allow investors interested in 
shariah complaint equities to manage investments efficiently and reduce risks.  
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Appendix (1) 
Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) Test: 
Results of VIF test provide evidence that no multicollineratiy exist between any of the x-
variables; as VIF was reported to be within the acceptable tolerance level (below 5) for all x-
variables. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable R- squared VIF 
Shariah_ dummy 0.033206 1.03434651 
ICRG 0.361547 1.566286007 
GDP 0.100889 1.112209727 
Inflation 0.327666 1.487355987 
Interest_ rate 0.353225 1.546132735 
EPS 0.00458 1.004601073 
Dividend payout 0.024909 1.025545308 
Asset growth 0.005866 1.005900613 
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Appendix 2 
    
 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
Measures of Financial Performance 
   Table (9) 
 
(1) 
Adjusted market returns 
(2) 
Log (Tobin’s Q) 
Constant -0.013123*** 
(0.003548)  
    0.169348*** 
(0.001961) 
 
Shariah_ dummy    0.038024*** 
(0.005836) 
 
0.126555*** 
(0.126555) 
Observations 66894 61148 
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error. 
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively 
The above regression was conducted using the following equation  
𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦  +Error 
where the dependent variables used were Adjusted Returns and Log (Tobin’s Q) 
alternatively. 
Dependent Variable 
Measures of Financial Performance 
 
 
(1) 
Adjusted market returns 
(2) 
Log (Tobin’s Q) 
Constant 
 
       -0.747242*** 
        (0.094273) 
-0.404564*** 
(0.049823) 
 
Shariah_ dummy 
 
     
        0.059857*** 
        (0.006422) 
 
 
0.125387*** 
(0.003476) 
 
                      
                        ICRG 
 
         0.008760*** 
         (0.001172) 
 
0.007158*** 
(0.000621) 
   
Observations 59247 54146 
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error. 
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively 
The above regression was conducted using the following equation  
𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 +  𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟           
where the dependent variables used were Adjusted Returns and Log (Tobin’s Q) 
alternatively. 
   Table (10)  
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Dependent Variable 
Measures of Financial Performance 
Table (11) 
 
(1) 
Adjusted market returns 
(2) 
Log (Tobin’s Q) 
Constant    -0.798253*** 
      (0.101069) 
-0.487567*** 
(0.053442) 
 
 Shariah_dummy  
        
        0.184112** 
        (0.088992) 
 
 
              0.325857*** 
(0.046882) 
 
 
ICRG 
 
 
Cross Effect_ ICRG_ Shariah 
         0.009399*** 
         (0.001258)   
 
         -0.001535 * 
          (0.001097) 
        
0.008200*** 
(0.000666) 
 
            -0.002483*** 
             (0.000579) 
Observations 59247 54146 
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error. 
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively 
The above regression was conducted using the following equation  
𝛽0 + +𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟           
where the dependent variables used were Adjusted Returns and Log (Tobin’s Q) 
alternatively. 
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Dependent Variable 
Measures of Financial Performance 
Table (12) 
 
(1) 
Adjusted market returns 
(2) 
Log (Tobin’s Q) 
Constant        -0.368190*** 
       (0.110218) 
-0.182923*** 
(0.056485) 
 
 Shariah_dummy  
        
        0.244901*** 
        (0.083306) 
 
 
             0.286501*** 
(0.046806) 
 
 
ICRG 
 
 
Cross Effect_ ICRG_ Shariah 
 
 
GDP 
         0.003795*** 
         (0.001389)   
 
         -0.003137 *** 
          (0.001027) 
      
          0.023959*** 
         (0.001675) 
0.004017*** 
(0.000713) 
 
            -0.002063*** 
             (0.000578) 
 
             0.013973*** 
             (0.000860) 
 
 
 
Observations 59247 54146 
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error. 
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively 
The above regression was conducted using the following equation  
𝛽0 + +𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝛽4 𝐺𝐷𝑃
+ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟           
where the dependent variables used were Adjusted Returns and Log (Tobin’s Q) 
alternatively. 
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Dependent Variable 
Measures of Financial Performance 
Table (13) 
 
(1) 
Adjusted market returns 
(2) 
Log (Tobin’s Q) 
Constant        -0.325148*** 
       (0.110540) 
-0.143825** 
(0.056730) 
 
 Shariah_dummy  
        
        0.237879*** 
        (0.083298) 
 
 
             0.286840*** 
(0.046780) 
 
 
ICRG 
 
 
Cross Effect_ ICRG_ Shariah 
 
 
                         GDP 
 
 
Inflation 
         0.003637*** 
         (0.001389)   
 
         -0.003063 *** 
          (0.001027) 
      
          0.021410*** 
         (0.001754) 
 
         -0.011215*** 
           (0.002283) 
 
0.003745*** 
(0.000713) 
 
            -0.002070*** 
             (0.000578) 
 
             0.013158*** 
             (0.000867) 
 
            -0.007116*** 
             (0.001016) 
 
Observations 59247 54146 
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error. 
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively 
The above regression was conducted using the following equation  
𝛽0 + +𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝛽4 𝐺𝐷𝑃
+ 𝛽5 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟           
where the dependent variables used were Adjusted Returns and Log (Tobin’s Q) 
alternatively. 
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Dependent Variable 
Measures of Financial Performance 
Table (14) 
 
 
(1) 
Adjusted market returns 
(2) 
Log (Tobin’s Q) 
Constant        -0.200164** 
       (0.112282) 
-0.135502** 
(0.057183) 
 
 Shariah_ dummy  
        
        0.199894** 
        (0.083486) 
 
 
             0.283274*** 
(0.046882) 
 
 
ICRG 
 
 
Cross Effect_ ICRG_ Shariah 
 
 
                         GDP 
 
 
Inflation 
 
 
Interest_ rate 
         0.002678** 
         (0.001397)   
 
         -0.002596 ** 
          (0.001029) 
      
          0.019820*** 
         (0.001771) 
 
         -0.009386*** 
         (0.002301) 
          
        -0.009399***                           
         (0.001500) 
 
0.003703*** 
(0.000714) 
 
            -0.002026*** 
             (0.000579) 
 
             0.013006*** 
             (0.000877) 
 
            -0.006934*** 
             (0.001029) 
 
            -0.000969* 
              (0.000837) 
Observations 59247 54146 
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error. 
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively 
The above regression was conducted using the following equation  
𝛽0 + +𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝛽4 𝐺𝐷𝑃
+ 𝛽5 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽6   𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟           
where the dependent variables used were Adjusted Returns and Log (Tobin’s Q) 
alternatively. 
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Dependent Variable 
Measures of Financial Performance 
Table (15) 
 
(1) 
Adjusted market returns 
(2) 
Log (Tobin’s Q) 
Constant        -0.200164** 
       (0.112282) 
-0.135502** 
(0.057183) 
 
 Shariah_dummy  
        
        0.199894** 
        (0.083486) 
 
 
             0.283274*** 
(0.046882) 
 
 
ICRG 
 
 
Cross Effect_ ICRG_ Shariah 
 
 
                         GDP 
 
 
Inflation 
 
 
Interest_ rate 
         0.002678** 
         (0.001397)   
 
         -0.002596 ** 
          (0.001029) 
      
          0.019820*** 
         (0.001771) 
 
         -0.009386*** 
         (0.002301) 
          
        -0.009399***                           
         (0.001500) 
 
0.003703*** 
(0.000714) 
 
            -0.002026*** 
             (0.000579) 
 
             0.013006*** 
             (0.000877) 
 
            -0.006934*** 
             (0.001029) 
 
            -0.000969* 
              (0.000837) 
Observations 59247 54146 
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error. 
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively 
The above regression was conducted using the following equation  
𝛽0 + +𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝛽4 𝐺𝐷𝑃
+ 𝛽5 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽6   𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟           
where the dependent variables used were Adjusted Returns and Log (Tobin’s Q) 
alternatively. 
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Dependent Variable 
Measures of Financial Performance 
Table (16) 
 
(1) 
Adjusted market returns 
(2) 
Log (Tobin’s Q) 
Constant        -0.160290* 
       (0.110547) 
-0.141961** 
(0.057028) 
 
 Shariah_ dummy  
        
        0.187051** 
        (0.082287) 
 
 
             0.288570*** 
(0.046816) 
 
 
ICRG 
 
 
Cross Effect_ ICRG_ Shariah 
 
 
                         GDP 
 
 
Inflation 
 
 
Interest_ rate 
 
 
Asset_ growth 
         0.001982* 
         (0.001376)   
 
         -0.002276 ** 
          (0.001014) 
      
          0.018565*** 
         (0.001741) 
 
         -0.009647*** 
         (0.002269) 
          
        -0.009399***                           
         (0.001472) 
 
          0.001114***                                               
           (2.82E-05) 
 
0.003744*** 
(0.000712) 
 
            -0.002064*** 
             (0.000578) 
 
             0.012457*** 
             (0.000875) 
 
            -0.007337*** 
             (0.001027) 
 
            -0.001108* 
              (0.000832) 
 
0.000228*** 
             (1.79E-05) 
       
Observations 58178 53709 
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error. 
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively 
The above regression was conducted using the following equation  
𝛽0 + +𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝛽4 𝐺𝐷𝑃 +
𝛽5 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽6   𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽7 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ+ E𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟           
where the dependent variables used were Adjusted Returns and Log (Tobin’s Q) 
alternatively. 
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Dependent Variable 
Measures of Financial Performance 
Table (17) 
 
(1) 
Adjusted market returns 
(2) 
Log (Tobin’s Q) 
Constant        -0.191627* 
       (0.119279) 
-0.108333* 
(0.060767) 
 
 Shariah_ dummy  
        
        0.189301** 
        (0.089332) 
 
 
             0.291484*** 
(0.050149) 
 
 
ICRG 
 
 
Cross Effect_ ICRG_ Shariah 
 
 
                         GDP 
 
 
Inflation 
 
 
Interest_ rate 
 
 
Asset_ growth 
 
 
Dividend_ payout  
         0.002307* 
         (0.001486)   
 
         -0.002338 ** 
          (0.001103) 
      
          0.018062*** 
         (0.001857) 
 
         -0.008820*** 
         (0.002462) 
          
        -0.009152***                           
         (0.001615) 
 
         0.001102***                                               
         (3.03E-05) 
       
        0.000667*** 
        (0.000178) 
0.003260*** 
(0.000760) 
 
            -0.002112*** 
             (0.000620) 
 
             0.011809*** 
             (0.000925) 
 
            -0.008858*** 
             (0.001100) 
 
            -0.001300* 
              (0.000913) 
 
0.000243*** 
             (1.93E-05) 
 
              0.000849*** 
              (9.65E-05) 
 
 
Observations 52362    48111 
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error. 
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively 
The above regression was conducted using the following equation  
𝛽0 + +𝛽1𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺 + 𝛽3𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝐼𝐶𝑅𝐺_𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝛽4 𝐺𝐷𝑃 +
𝛽5 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽6   𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡_𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽7 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ+ 𝛽8Dividend_ payout 
+E𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟           
where the dependent variables used were Adjusted Returns and Log (Tobin’s Q) 
alternatively. 
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Appendix 3 
 
 
Dependent Variable 
Measures of Financial Performance 
Table (18) (1) 
Log (Tobin’s Q) 
Constant 0.391144*** 
(0.002405) 
 
Elections_ dummy -0.012161** 
(0.005140) 
Observations                            13471 
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error. 
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively 
The above regression was conducted using the following  
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠_ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟            
 
where the dependent variable used was Log (Tobin’s Q) 
 
Dependent Variable 
Measures of Financial Performance 
Table (19) (1) 
Log (Tobin’s Q) 
Constant 
 
 
Elections_ dummy 
0.391197*** 
(0.002404) 
 
-0.006845* 
(0.005388) 
 
 
Cross Effect_ elections_ shariah -0.054275*** 
(0.016562) 
Observations                            13471 
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error. 
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively 
The above regression was conducted using the following  
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐸𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟            
 
where the dependent variable used was Log (Tobin’s Q) 
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Dependent Variable 
Measures of Financial Performance 
Table (20) (1) 
Log (Tobin’s Q) 
Constant 
 
 
Shariah _ dummy 
0.362086*** 
(0.003213) 
 
 0.061741*** 
(0.005362) 
 
 
Cross Effect_ elections_ shariah -0.075213*** 
(0.015755) 
Observations                            13471 
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error. 
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively 
The above regression was conducted using the following  
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 
where the dependent variable used was Log (Tobin’s Q) 
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Dependent Variable 
Measures of Financial Performance 
Table (21) (1) 
Log (Tobin’s Q) 
Constant 
 
 
Shariah _ dummy 
0.398630*** 
(0.010533) 
 
 0.062987*** 
(0.005370) 
 
 
Cross Effect_ elections_ shariah 
 
 
GDP 
-0.081320*** 
(0.015835) 
 
-0.016262*** 
(0.004464) 
 
 
Observations                            13471 
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error. 
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively 
The above regression was conducted using the following  
= 𝛽0 + 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠_ 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝛽2 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽3  𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 
where the dependent variable used was Log (Tobin’s Q) 
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Dependent Variable 
Measures of Financial Performance 
Table (22) (1) 
Log (Tobin’s Q) 
Constant 
 
 
Shariah _ dummy 
0.489414*** 
(0.013877) 
 
 0.057582*** 
(0.005375) 
 
 
Cross Effect_ elections_ shariah 
 
 
GDP 
 
 
Inflation  
-0.085507*** 
(0.015773) 
 
-0.032656*** 
(0.004738) 
 
-0.029145*** 
(0.002917) 
 
 
Observations                            13471 
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error. 
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively 
The above regression was conducted using the following  
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠_ 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝛽2 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽3  𝐺𝐷𝑃
+ 𝛽4  𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 
where the dependent variable used was Log (Tobin’s Q) 
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Dependent Variable 
Measures of Financial Performance 
Table (23) (1) 
Log (Tobin’s Q) 
Constant 
 
 
Shariah _ dummy 
0.487516*** 
(0.013868) 
 
 0.057862*** 
(0.005368) 
 
 
Cross Effect_ elections_ shariah 
 
 
GDP 
 
 
Inflation 
 
 
Asset_ growth  
-0.084285*** 
(0.015756) 
 
-0.032830*** 
(0.004732) 
 
-0.029575*** 
(0.002915) 
 
0.000219*** 
(4.82E-05) 
 
Observations                            13468 
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error. 
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively 
The above regression was conducted using the following  
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_ 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠_ 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝛽2 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽3  𝐺𝐷𝑃
+ 𝛽4  𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽5   𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 
where the dependent variable used was Log (Tobin’s Q) 
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Dependent Variable 
Measures of Financial Performance 
Table (24) (1) 
Log (Tobin’s Q) 
Constant 
 
 
Shariah _ dummy 
1.556868*** 
(0.070074) 
 
 0.045062*** 
(0.005376) 
 
 
Cross Effect_ elections_ shariah 
 
 
GDP 
 
 
Inflation 
 
 
Asset_ growth  
 
 
Size 
-0.083588*** 
(0.015592) 
 
-0.023935*** 
(0.004718) 
 
-0.030447*** 
(0.002885) 
 
0.000393*** 
(4.90E-05) 
 
-0.189444*** 
(0.012174) 
 
 
Observations                            13468 
(1) Parenthesis implies St. Error. 
(2) *, **, *** Indicate statistical significance at the 10,5, 1% levels respectively 
The above regression was conducted using the following  
= 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡_𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ + 𝛽2 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎ℎ_𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + 𝛽3  𝐺𝐷𝑃
+ 𝛽4  𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽5   𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡_𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ + 𝛽6   𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 + 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 
where the dependent variable used was Log (Tobin’s Q) 
